This article investigates the patronage phenomenon in the italian, so called, Second Republic. In particular, the analysis argues that (ex) members of parliament are appointed to managerial boards in italian (partially) state-owned enterprises responding to political selection rationales. Indeed, direct political connections could be conceptualize as an instrument to control and reward politicians' loyalty throughout a legislature. Especially in a majoritarian electoral system, where the interests of political parties and districts may diverge, the formers would need patronage resource to assure themselves members of parliament loyalty when casting ballots. The results of the empirical investigation suggests that parliamentarians' loyalty does play a role in patronage appointments as well as the electoral result in the next electoral competition 1 .
Introduction
Even though nowadays Italy is a well established democracy organized according the principles of free market and private property, the state retains an important role in several sectors of the economy.
2 The perceived success of the British Telecom initial public offering (1984) persuade many other industrialized countries to begin divesting state owned enterprises (SOEs). Italy has not been an exception: italian government, leaded by Silvio Berlusconi, launched a large privatization program in july 1994 (l. 474/1994) .
It has been theoretically suggested by Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) that under conditions of perfect competition and without informational problems ownership should not matter. The original arguments in favor of public ownership were justified as a solution to the lack of the above conditions, and to market failures like externalities and natural monopolies. Actually, SOEs were created as a direct instrument to channel investments in priority sectors as perceived by the policy makers, to implement full employment policies and to promote a balanced regional development. Nevertheless, by the 1970s, the performance of SOEs came under increasing scrutiny due to inefficiency, mismanagement, corruption and political interference. Privatization of SOEs has been viewed as a policy instrument for reducing the impact of political factors on economic performance, as pointed out by Vickers and Yarrow (1991) . The dominant trend in literature advances political interference in SOEs operations as a negative influence on output targets, 3 as stated among others by Boubakri et al. (2008) , Menozzi and Vannoni (2012) and Carretta et al. (2012) . Also, there is a consensus about how government ownership is an effective channel of redistribution for political dividends. SOEs would tend to answer to political masters instead of market rationales as pointed out by Clarke and Cull (2002) , Cragg and Dyck (2003) and Boubakri et al. (2011) . Indeed, politicians forfeit an important means of generating political support when they privatize SOEs, losing the possibility to provide public employment and/or lucrative contracts to their supporters, like remarked by Shleifer and Vishny (1994) . Many authors have criticized the italian way of privatizing SOEs.
4 Notwithstanding the privatization process that took place since the 1990s, the public sector continues to own large shares in many utilities such as gas and water supply, rail transport and so forth. In this research we assume that this enduring role of the state in SOEs and partially privatized firms could be an instrument for resource patronage.
5 Furthemore, also local government units (LGUs) have freedom of choice about the ownership structure of firms providing local public services. In Italy, as well as in other european countries, LGUs can autonomously organize local utilities: the formers can be the sole owners of the latters, or they can stand in co-participation with other LGUs or with private agents. Bortolotti et al. (2007) use the term "municipal capitalism" to describe the phenomenon. Including local public utilities in the range of the firms possibly used for patronage should be correct, at least for the italian case. Despite italian parties show a low level of verticalization between national and sub-national units, "the central office controls the organizational regulation of the sub-national level, the selection of candidates to national elections and the allocation of state funds."
6
In addition, especially in Italy, the legal definitions of public enterprises are variable: some have mixed ownership (public-private), some are totally private but under the supervision of public sector entities and some are pure SOEs, totally public (enti pubblici ). This organizational intricacy dampers the public sector accountability and probably favors the intertwining of private-public enterprises (PPEs) and patronage dynamics. In Italy, in the period under analysis (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , government alternation could have played a role in SOEs and PPEs politicization through the substitution of directors elected by the previous governing party.
7
The research presented in this paper is an attempt to empirically analyze patronage occurrences and to verify if governing parties exploit appointments in PPEs boards of director as a means of control and reward for their loyal members of parliament (MPs), as suggested by Bolleyer (2009) and by Kopeckỳ et al. (2012) . In this perspective patronage represents a useful resource for the party self-maintenance: a selective benefit to assure individual loyalty. A patron (government party) controls a desired good (appointment) and has the choice to reward certain MPs and exclude others. Hence, the MP provides support hoping for the appointment or, vice versa, the government party selects MPs' appointments in the expectation that support (or loyalty) will be provided in the future. The above dynamic would figure an agency relationship between political parties and MPs, where the formers exploit the selective incentives represented by an appointment to a SOE board of director, thanks to their persistent control on SOEs and PPEs, and the latters may reserve a chance for a political career, as intended by Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) .
8 Parties usually offer incentives to MPs for voting along party lines.
9 However elected MPs are accountable to their constituents and they can be tempted to cultivate a personal vote.
10 The existence of single-member districts represents a clear link between a geographically defined group of voters and the MP (Mitchell (2000) , Grofman (2005) ). Moreover, given the recent reduction in party attachment, constituents may be willing to hugely consider MP behaviour when casting their votes.
11 Then, viewing patronage as an organizational resource for parties, we
propose SOEs and PPEs boards appointments as additional tools to stimulate MPs loyalty in roll-call votes as in Kopeckỳ et al. (2012) . We focus the attention on three cohorts of MPs: those elected to the XII, XIII and XIV legislatures of italian parliament. We consider these cohorts of politicians for data availability and in order to avoid a possible structural break due to a change in the italian electoral rule. The so-called Mattarellum 12 established that a 75% of the representatives were elected with a majoritarian system and the remaining 25% according to a proportional system (mixed system). Italy was divided into 475 uninominal House districts. In each district, one MP was elected by simple plurality according to a pure first-past-the-post election. The remaining representatives were then selected with a proportional rule among the candidates of the parties that reached a treshold of at least the 4% of the total national votes, with a mechanism favoring the losing parties in the uninominal districts. For the Senate, 232 MPs were elected according to a simple plurality rule in uninominal districts and the remaining senators were selected according to a proportional system. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in the next two paragraphs we describe the dataset and the methodology used to conduct the empirical investigation; in section 4 we present the results; finally concluding remarks are provided in the last section. 12 From the legislator Sergio Mattarella who sponsored the electoral rule reform.
Data and variables
The dataset used is the Italian Members of Parliament (2009) dataset, kindly provided by the Rodolfo De Benedetti foundation. These data contain detailed information on all individuals who have been elected to the Italian Parliament, since the inception of the Italian Republic in 1948. The data span 60 years . In addition we manually compiled a second dataset regarding the appointments of MPs in SOEs and PPEs boards of directors thanks to the Telemaco online archive of the Chamber of Commerce of Italy. Thanks to this database we have been able to investigate MPs' past and present experience as members (or presidents) of boards of directors in PPEs.
13 The empirical analysis is conducted on a sample of 1237 italian MPs elected over the period 1994-2001. 14 Among these 1237 MPs, 808 are present in only one legislature, 298 in two legislatures (not necessarily consecutive) and 131 in every included legislature. Totally there are 1797 observations.
We call the dependent variable appointment: it is a dichotomous variable equal to one if, after the end of the legislature and within two years, the MP has been appointed in a PPE 15 board of director, zero otherwise. We chose a period of two years to consider the organizational time that may be required to a party to make an appointment effective. In Italy the power of parties in appointing (ex) politicians in publicly owned firms boards has been underlined by Di Mascio (2011), who explicitly defines resource patronage the control of these appointments as a usage of public resources subsequently used as selective incentives. Several regressors are included among political key variables. The first one, rebellion rate, is a proxy of the dissent a MP expresses towards his/her own party. It is a ratio between the number or votes for which the MP was not present without a justification and the total number of votes at which the MP should have been present.
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We consider prominent also the electoral result of MPs in the following national election, in order to test if the appointment could be exploited as an exit strategy by the MP him/herself. The (in sample) MPs' feasible outcomes are three: at the end of a term he/she can run and win (and so be reelected), run and loose or retire. The first case is adopted as base case and two dummy variables have been put into the regression equation for the rest of the possible electoral 13 Where a public entity holds, directly and indirectly, firm capital shares. 14 Observations with missing values are dropped from the sample 15 We consider PPEs those firms, directly or indirectly, at least partially owned by the State or by LGUs. 16 We counted absences without justification as "passive nay" votes, similarly to Heller and Mershon (2008) . We have considered this kind of dissent appropriate to let the variable indicate a MP's signal to her/his own party. On the legislative dissent and its detrimental effects see Indridason (2008) . Alternatively rebellion rate could be considered a proxy of MPs shrinking or rent seeking. Under this alternative view parties could consider an appointment as a reward for the MP's effort in parliament and not for his/her loyalty. See on this Gagliarducci et al. (2010) .
results (defeat and retire). The variable opposition is included to discriminate between ruling parties and opposition ones. Considering that the appointments occurr next the end of each legislature, and considering the strict alternation in government in the sample period, a positive value of the opposition variable would suggest a kind of spoils system in the "market of appointments".
17 Once in power, the ex opposition party would allocate its loyal (ex) MPs to the PPEs boards. In addition, we assume that the political expertise could affect positively the likelihood of being appointed in a PPE board after serving in parliament. The variable exp. lex account for the MP's political experience, measured in number of national parliament legislatures in which the MP has been present before being elected in the legislature under investigation. Since 1982, the Italian law requires MPs to disclose their annual tax returns.
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Then among included control regressors we inserted extra income 1st year which is a continous variable reporting the annual income from activities outside parliament, expressed in 2005 thousands of euros, in the first year of the term. Being unavailable the MPs income before entering the Parliament we use this income variable as a proxy of the MP's income before entering the parliament,
19
and, as in Galasso and Nannicini (2011) , as a proxy for the MP's ability. In addition we include the age variable which specifies the age a MP had at the end of the legislature, in order to check if the MP's age has a valuable effect on being appointed. In addition, public exp. and private exp. are two dummy variables equal to one if the MP before being elected to the current legislature, respectively, have had an appointment in a PPE board of directors and if he/she worked as manager of a private firm (or if he/she was a self employed). This qualitative variables, in our view, should represent a MP bent in leading a (public) firm and his talent. If this control would be significant and positive we could add a professional motivation for the appointment. Legislatures dummy variables ( XIII lex and XIV lex ) and female are included in the regression capturing, respectively, possible time trends and gender issues. The summary statistics are provided below. In general 5% of the MPs in the sample have been appointed within the time interval (two years) we considered valid for the dependent variable being equal to one. This figure could appear not so substantial but, if we consider those appointments related to the not reelected MPs (defeated or retired), the percentage amounts to 13% for the defeated legislators and to 11% for the retired ones. The rebellion rate variable varies from values very close to zero to values almost equal to one. The low values of defeat and retire seem to confirm the incumbency advantage hypothesis. Also the political experience variable show a huge level of heterogeneity, including MPs elected for the first time in the current legislature and MPs with a long political career. The sample shows a well educated political class which also shows a very clear male predominance. In this section we illustrate the empirical model of our work. The goal of this part of the research is to investigate how MPs' political characteristics could influence the probability of being appointed in a PPE board of directors after a term in parliament. So we implement the following regression equation starting from a pooled ordinary least squares estimation
where the vector of individual characteristics, X i , and legislatures dummies, lex, are used to explain the phenomenon. 20 We consider the linear probability model our natural starting point. Parameters are the change in probability of success given a one-unit increase of the regressors. If the explanatory variable is binary the related parameter is just the difference in the probability of success when it is equal to one respect to the case where it is equal to zero, holding the other regressors fixed. In order to deal with heteroskedasticity we use standard heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Nevertheless, since the OLS fitted value is an estimate of the conditional probability P (y = 1|x i ), it is troublesome if the predicted probability is negative or above unity. Aside from the issue of fitted values being outside the unit interval, the linear probability model implies that a ceteris paribus unit increase in the regressors always changes P (y = 1|x i ) by the same amount, regardless of the initial value of the covariate. So increasing one of the explanatory variables would eventually drive P (y = 1|x i ) to be less than zero or greater than one. Here, the main purpose of estimating our binary response model is to approximate the marginal effects of the explanatory variables, even if not necessarily averaged across the distribution of the regressors. The fact that some predicted probabilities are outside the unit interval and that the linear probability model does not provide good estimates for extreme values of the regressors lead me to consider also a nonlinear model. Next we will show how a Probit model largely confirms the main results. Nonlinearity is considered more appropriate given that about 22% of the predicted values by ordinary least squares estimation is negative. In doing this we study our binary response model in the form P (y = 1|x) = G(xβ) ≡ p(x), where, therefore, the marginal effect of x i depends on x through the index xβ, and where the function G maps the index into the response probability. We will also show that Probit and Logit models give very similar results in terms of average marginal effects. As shown below, they also display almost equal measures of goodness of fit. Notwithstanding the dataset is strongly unbalanced we 20 In order to check for nonlinearity in the parameters we have also included in the regression square terms of the continuous variable, not obtaining significant results. We also tried to interact the rebellion rate variable with the other variables, again, without significant results.
21 See on this Wooldridge (2010 Trivedi (2005) . The covariance matrix is estimated by bootstrap resampling over id. 22 Using 5000 bootstrap repetitions the p-value of the test converges to 0.1512 suggesting the not statistically significance of individual fixed effects. In absence of fixed effects we implement a random effect estimation, which tend to be fully efficient under the RE model. Secondly, moving to nonlinearity and in line with the preceding analysis in the linear case, we test for the presence of fixed effects through a Hausman test for non linear models, 23 in line with Mundlak (1978) . We run an auxiliary regression including as additional explanatory variables the individual means of all the time-varying covariates and then we run the model as a random effect probit. Then we test the significance of the individual means trough a Wald test. Assuming fixed effects follow a normal distribution and being linear combinations of the individual means times related coefficients, also in this non linear version of the model we would exclude fixed effects. In this case the p-value is 0.9955. Moreover, it can be noted a nearly zero value of the variance due to differences across panels (intraclass correlation).
22 The identification variable. 23 See Wooldridge (2010) As alternative way to establish how negligible should be a panel analysis, given the characteristics of the sample, we propose other two estimates (for linear and non linear specifications) including in the sample only those MPs elected just once in the sample period. The difference in coefficients between the subsample estimates and the full sample ones should suggest us the importance of the within variances in explaining the phenomenon. Then we calculate the average marginal effects to make the linear and non linear estimates comparable. We provide, in addition, also the average marginal effects related to the corresponding logit model to verify how imposing different distributional assumptions on the error term of the latent regression could modify the estimates. Finally we consider endogeneity issues. Endogeneity arises in our model in all of the three usual ways: omitted variables, due to data unavailability, measurement error, due to imperfect measures of some regressors (e.g. rebellion rate), and simultaneity, due to the possibile reverse causality between the dependent variable and (one of) the regressors. What the dataset allow me to do is testing the exogeneity of the retire variable through an instrumental variable approach, using the age 24 variable as an instrument in the linear specification of the model. Therefore, we conduct the Hausman test for endogeneity 25 through an auxiliary regression. For the other variables included in the estimation we have not available instruments in the dataset to check for endogeneity.
Results
Once we exclude the possibility for fixed effects through the two heterogeneityautocorrelation robust Hausman tests implemented (for the linear specification) and through a Mundlak approach (for the non linear specification), we prefer the pooled analysis respect to a random effects model, also considering that the coefficients and the significance of the variables of main interest holds (even if at a lower significance level) once the estimation is based on a subsample in which MPs compare only once, excluding in this way within heterogeneity.
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Determining the "correct" specification of the model is not necessarily an issue in the present work. The specific form of the function that maps the index model into the response probability (the identity function for the LPM, the standard normal or the standard logistic cumulative distribution functions for the probit model and the logit model, respectively) can not be derived from an existing economic model. Moreover, given that the main purpose of our study is to approximate partial and marginal effects averaged across the distribution of the included (political) regressors, most likely LPM should do a nice job, 27 even if nothing guarantees that LPM provides good estimates of the partial effects for extreme values of the included continuous regressors. In table 2.10 we report comparable values, the parameters estimates of LPM and the average partial and marginal effects of the probit and the logit model. We assume that the differences in the estimates are not so huge to question the general sense of the results. The results of the estimation of the econometric models, illustrated in Tables  2.4 and 2.5, show that, beyond the specification of the model, some covariates are always statistically significant in explaining this particular labor market of italian MPs. In both specifications, linear and non linear, political variables as the electoral result in the next elections and the MP's rate of rebellion to his/her own party in the legislature are strongly significant. Table 7 : Non linear models comparison
The related signs of the coefficients seem to indicate appointments in PPEs boards as a patronage exit strategy for MPs who have been loyal to party in the previous legislature.
28 The opposition regressor, being positive, tends to confirm what is general known as the spoils system. Given that in each legislature in the sample the opposition party becomes the ruling one after next elections, and that the considered appointments are those made after the election day, we would suggest that, once in power, the ex opposition party nominates its (ex) MPs in the boards of directors of PPEs, still in control of political parties. As regards the control variables the estimation of the model shows that both education and female have a negative effect, although negligible, on being appointed after the term. These findings seem to suggest firstly, that more educated MPs are less interested in an exit strategy at the end of their career as politicians and secondly, that also in this particular labor market we assist to a gender issue.
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As written above we propose the analysis considering only one time parliamentarians in order to show how the estimates change and how negligible are individual effects. The results are shown below, both for the linear case and the probit model. From the figures we can see how, qualitatively, the reasoning does not change only considering one time legislators. Lastly, we test the endogeneity of the retire variable using as instrument the age variable. Implementing the Hausman procedure and employing the usual t-test on the computed residuals of the first stage regression, we can show that they have not statistical significance, with a p-value equal to 0.869. This result would suggest the opportunity to consider the retire variable as exogenous. Using the age variable as an instrument for retire has seemed quite a straightforward solution, considering variables available in the dataset. Nevertheless, in doing this we do not exploit any economic or political science theory. We are aware that we could obtain a bias in finite samples when the instrument is only weakly correlated with considered endogenous variable. In reporting the two stages we show the correlation between the two variables. In this case, the instrumented variable seems to hold stastical significance, although only at 10% level. Indeed, larger standard errors depend on the quality of the instrument used in estimation. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses Significant at level *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% . Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses Significant at level *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% . t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001 Table 13 : Pooled Probit. AME.
Conclusions
Differently from the so-called "revolving door" mechanism, where politicians take up consulting or lobbying jobs in the private market after exiting office, the patronage phenomenon, as Kopeckỳ and Scherlis (2008) define it, is "the power of a party to appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life." The established main motivations for patronage are rewarding and controlling, as in Kopeckỳ et al. (2012) : "the former implies that parties hand out appointments to fellow partisans in return for their loyalty, whereas the latter suggests that parties intend to exert influence over some areas of public policy". Our empirical analysis try to shed light on a particular, and limited, segment of this phenomenon in Italy, considering MPs as the targets of appointments in partially privatized and mixed firms boards of governors. In doing this we assume that, as stated by Di Mascio (2012), parties can effectively control public and semi-public firms, being themselves the substantial appointing authority for this particular kind of enterprises. In addition, we fully realize that MPs could represent only a very restricted fraction of the possible targets of patronage appointments made in the political arena (possibly being only the tip of the iceberg, the most visible part of the phenomenon). The results show how parties exploit political appointments in managerial board of controlled firms as an individual disciplining tool for the loyalty shown by its MPs during a (previous) legislature. Considering how the literature, even specifically for the italian case, describes party loyalty as a burden for MPs' reelection concerns, we suggest how a political appointment in a semi-public firm could be used by parties as a reward, or a possible exit strategy, for loyal parliamentarians. This work provides some evidence of the quantitative dimension of the phenomenon. In our view the analysis could represent a contribution to the debate about MPs' conflict of interests (and not only about members of Government, as the recent reform process has intended 30 ). A future research project could be to implement a similar analysis concerning legislatures ruled by the new proportional electoral rule, as modified by l. 270/2005. In doing this, data about voting against party line should be collected; indeed they may be more convincing than unjustified absences rates, given that absentee rates might be interpreted also as a sign of laziness. Furthemore, it would be interesting to insert in the analysis data on the ex ante re-election chances of MPs (proxied by, e.g., the electoral history of single districts) checking if this aspect could influence the MPs' appointment likelihood. 30 We refer to l. 190/2012 and to d.lgs. 39/2013. 
